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ABSTRACT 
Hundreds of contaminated facilities and sites must be cleaned up.  “Cleanup” includes decommissioning, 
environmental restoration, and waste management.  Cleanup can be complex, expensive, risky, and time-consuming.  
Decisions are often controversial, can stall or be blocked, and are sometimes re-done - some before implementation, 
some decades later.  Making and keeping decisions with long time horizons involves special difficulties and requires 
new approaches, including: 
? New ways (mental model) to analyze and visualize the problem, 
? Awareness of the option to shift strategy or reframe from a single decision to an adaptable network of 
decisions, and 
? Improved tactical processes that account for several challenges.  These include the following: 
? Stakeholder values are a more fundamental basis for decision making and keeping than “meeting 
regulations.” 
? Late-entry players and future generations will question decisions. 
? People may resist making “irreversible” decisions. 
? People need “compelling reasons” to take action in the face of uncertainties. 
Our project goal is to make cleanup decisions easier to make, implement, keep, and sustain.  By sustainability, we 
mean decisions that work better over the entire time-period—from when a decision is made, through 
implementation, to its end point.  That is, alternatives that can be kept “as is” or adapted as circumstances change.  
Increased attention to sustainability and adaptability may decrease resistance to making and implementing decisions. 
Our KONVERGENCE framework addresses these challenges.  The framework is based on a mental model that 
states: where Knowledge, Values, and Resources converge (the K, V, R in KONVERGENCE), you will find a 
sustainable decision.  We define these areas or universes as follows: 
? Knowledge: what is known about the problem and possible solutions? 
? Values: what is important to those affected by the decision? 
? Resources: what is available to implement possible solutions or improve knowledge? 
This mental model helps analyze and visualize what is happening as decisions are made and kept.  Why is there 
disagreement?  Is there movement toward konvergence?  Is a past decision drifting out of konvergence?  The 
framework includes strategic improvements, i.e., expand the spectrum of alternatives to include adaptable 
alternatives and decision networks.  It includes tactical process improvements derived from experience, values, and 
relevant literature.  This paper includes diagnosis and medication (suggested path forward) for intractable cases. 
OVERVIEW
Some cleanup decisions, such as cleanup of intractable contaminated sites or disposal of spent nuclear fuel, have 
proven difficult to make.  Such decisions face high resistance to agreement from stakeholders possibly because they 
do not trust the decision makers, view the consequences of being wrong as too high, etc.  Our project’s goal is to 
improve science-based cleanup decision-making.  This includes diagnosing intractable situations, as a step to 
identifying a path toward sustainable solutions. 
We are two-thirds through an internally funded project to develop improved decision making approaches.  Earlier 
papers describe the underlying philosophy of the KONVERGENCE Model for Sustainable Decisions,(1) the overall 
framework and process steps,(2) and diagnosis and prescription for intractable cases.(3)  There is a detailed 
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guidebook for decision making,(4) containing more details, examples, and rationale than can be included here.  This 
paper summarizes the project, emphasizing how to visualize disagreements and ways to make progress on stalled or 
intractable decisions.  Testing of the ideas and process steps is underway; one successful test is described below.  
We invite your suggestions and opportunities for additional testing and exploration of these concepts.  This is 
research and does not represent official positions of the Department of Energy or its contractors. 
Our framework addresses decision challenges with the following characteristics - complex and/or unusual 
relationships (of related decisions, among stakeholders, etc.), high likelihood for conflict, relatively high “stakes”, 
and ramifications that extend over long time periods.  We find relatively little decision science/decision engineering 
work focused on this domain.  Our particular field of application is cleanup of contaminated waste sites and 
facilities, but the framework should be applicable to other decision challenges with similar characteristics. 
The inadequacy of current approaches to long-term decision making is illustrated by the high degree of controversy 
and resultant stalling of some decisions, as well as revisiting past decisions.  The National Research Council states, 
“Because uncertainty is inherent in many of these areas, and because DOE’s preferred solutions – reliance on 
engineered barriers and institutional controls – are inherently failure prone, step-wise planning for DOE legacy 
sites must be systematic, integrative, comprehensive, and iterative in its execution through time, adaptive in the 
face of uncertainty, and active in the search for new and different solutions.  Planning for long-term institutional 
management should commence while remediation is underway.”(5) 
Note that a recent study did not find evidence that involving stakeholders in decisions lowered their quality.(6)  We 
encourage engagement of stakeholders as early as possible, recognizing that there are limits on who can, should, and 
wants to participate at any given time. 
One cause of difficulty in making long-lasting decisions is the way we approach them.  The typical way we try to 
make controversial decisions is to attempt brute force to overcome resistance.  Yet, in democratic societies, 
resistance can generally react to such brute force.  We then get a force-resistance battle, stalling a decision, while the 
original problem remains.  Perhaps it would be useful to break the single tough reaction (decision) into stages or 
reduce resistance by reducing the consequences of being wrong (more reversible thermodynamics). 
We have melded our experiences and analyses with ideas from decision science, action science, sociology, 
psychology, political science, ethics, history, “hard” sciences, risk assessment, and many engineering disciplines.  
Our KONVERGENCE framework combines new ideas, modifications of others’ ideas, and existing ideas.  The 
framework is based on a mental model that states: where Knowledge, Values, and Resources konverge (the K, V, R 
in KONVERGENCE), you will find a sustainable decision – a decision that works over time. 
? Knowledge: what is known about the problem and possible solutions? 
? Values: what is important to those affected by the decision? 
? Resources: what is available to implement possible solutions or improve knowledge? 
The framework includes (left side of fig. 1): 
? A mental model, KONVERGENCE, that describes some of the underlying decision dynamics that require 
cleanup alternatives to be (and to remain) konvergent with knowledge, values, and resources so the decision 
works over time (right side of fig. 1), it helps visualize what is happening, 
? Strategic improvements to frame the problem and expand the spectrum of alternatives to include adaptable 
alternatives and decision networks; 
? Tactical improvements such as processes and analytical tools derived from experience, values/principles, and 
relevant literature; and 
? Implications for R&D into possible solutions, to increase adaptability while reducing risk of residual hazards. 
We view regulations as an imperfect overlay or “snapshot” of values.(fig. 2)  The fact that regulations can never 
totally substitute for values is one of the underlying challenges.  Also, the number of participants in a decision is 
always less than the full set of stakeholders, everyone potentially impacted by a decision.  The framework suggests 
more effective, appropriate, and timely involvement and analysis to improve the validity of the values considered.  
An improved values component should make the decision more robust against “late entry” players. 
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Fig. 1.  The KONVERGENCE Framework (left) is an integrated package that will improve the odds to make 
and keep cleanup decisions; it is built on the KONVERGENCE model (right) that posits the need to keep 
konvergence among Knowledge, Values, and Resources.
Alternatives
Values
Resources
Knowledge
K V RON E GENCE
Laws &
Regulations
01-GA50964-08
Fig. 2.  Laws and regulations are an “overlap” of the Values universe 
The framework includes a generic set of 4 values and 20 principles that are a starting point for establishing 
“common ground” on both the process and objectives to select among alternatives.  The four values are equality,
democracy, trust, and reason.  As an example, the generic 20 principles include two Precautionary Principles. 
? Precautionary Principle 1– “Actions that pose a realistic threat of irreversible harm or catastrophic 
consequences should not be pursued unless there is some compelling countervailing need to benefit either 
current or future generations.”(7)
? Precautionary Principle 2 – “Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, scientific uncertainty 
shall not be used to postpone cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.”(8) 
Mental 
model 
Strategic framing
Principled tactics 
Data gathering/R&D
Implementation 
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These caution in differing ways.  The first cautions against taking actions prematurely if they pose threat of 
irreversible harm.  The second cautions against not taking action to protect against the threat of irreversible harm.  
Some cleanup problems can encompass risk of both types.  Consider a long-lived hazard that if left alone will 
eventually degrade, increase in risk, and become more difficult to cleanup.  Precautionary Principle 2 argues to take 
cost-effective measures now!  But which measures?  Version 1 argues against taking an irreversible action that 
might not be wise from the long-term view.  In such situations, how can we proceed? No action is dangerous; taking 
a wrong action is dangerous.  The concept of adaptable alternatives (managed risk) can offer a way out. 
Long-term problems require dynamic analysis, examining how the solution and/or the three universes of knowledge,
values, and resources may change.  The universes themselves interact.  For example, sustained changes in values
leads to changes in available resources.  The response time varies according to the resource in question.  Opening a 
new waste disposal site (a resource for an existing contaminated site) takes years.  Sustained allocation of resources
to research can increase knowledge.  Increased knowledge can change values or the relative weights among values.
The events of 9/11/2001 changed values (or at least prioritization among values).  Sustained changes in values also 
lead to changes in regulations.  Indeed, some past waste decisions have already drifted out of konvergence.
BASIS
The theoretical ideal test would be multiple side-by-side applications of a real, messy problem with real stakeholders 
with their range of real concerns, time limitations, etc. - once using the framework and once without.  Wait 100 
years; see what happens.  We have not performed such a test.  To our knowledge, neither has anyone else. 
We have observed, analyzed, and done the following: 
? The KONVERGENCE mental model is consistent with (and derived from) experience in many fields, 
including Kennedy’s management of the decision to go to the moon,(1) the observation that many proposed 
actions have been consistent with regulations but ultimately blocked (Brent Spar (9,10) being a good example), 
the observation that past decisions to bury waste are now being re-examined because of changes in knowledge
and priority among values, and the observation that decommissioning and cleanup of commercial reactors 
appears to be proceeding more smoothly than for DOE facilities.  Regarding the last point, the values of the 
affected people are similar; the technical challenges at DOE sites may be slightly more difficult; but the 
confidence in provision of resources is very different because commercial reactors have trust funds and DOE 
facilities are subject to yearly budget battles. 
? The strategic framing elements (emphasis on adaptability and decision networks) are consistent with the 
mental model, recommendations from the National Research Council (5, 11, 12) and National Academy of 
Public Administration,(7) common negotiation concepts (work in steps to earn confidence), the observation that 
decisions are often modified in practice (see for example (13)), and the technical realities that the decisions are 
truly linked and the ramifications are truly long-term. 
? The tactical process elements, especially the emphasis on understanding the broad range of values/principles, 
the search for common ground, and building process steps on principles are consistent with the best 
recommendations of facilitation/negotiation practitioners, and a range of social science studies.  The “Step 1” 
section below summarizes many factors that can increase or decrease resistance to making a decision. 
? We have tested the basic ideas with diverse people, including students, colleagues, waste 
management/decommissioning personnel, volunteers from the INEEL Citizen’s Advisory Board, and 
facilitation practitioners.  We encourage feedback from you!
? We have partially tested most process parts:
o Real, but simple problem, Citizen’s Advisory Board volunteers, knowing that this was only a test. 
o Real, messy problem, ourselves, knowing we will not make the decision. 
o Real, messy problem, class of students, knowing that they will not actually be making a decision.  They 
konverged without the need for weighting, utility functions, or controversy, but with variations that increase 
the “adaptability” of the selected alternative.  (See below.) 
o We are looking to assist decision making; we propose to proceed in a step-wise manner starting with 
internal testing and proceeding cautiously. 
? We have melded our experiences and analyses with ideas from decision science, action science, sociology, 
psychology, political science, ethics, history, physical sciences, risk assessment, and many engineering 
disciplines.  The team’s experience includes a former member of the INEEL Citizen’s Advisory Board (who is 
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now a professor at the University of Idaho), an expert in the middle of the effort to site a low-level waste 
disposal facility in Illinois, engineers with 2 decades of experience at the INEEL, experience in commercial 
nuclear projects, experience in international projects (a good way to understand U.S. culture is to work and live 
elsewhere), experience in adjusting the direction of energy technology development to increase the chance for 
societal interest, and a social scientist relatively new to the INEEL. 
No set of decision-support methods can guarantee that konvergence will emerge.  The first four process steps 
(Table I) emphasize establishing a common ground on why the problem is difficult, what the problem is, and what 
stakeholders are concerned about.  Although the literature and experience suggests that the combination of these 
ideas will increase the chance for reaching konvergence later, additional tests are in progress at this writing. 
Table I. Process Steps 
# Our Name Typical Names Purpose
1 Introduction Establish common ground:
? What makes the problems so difficult? 
2 The KONVERGENCE Model 
for Sustainable Decisions 
Introduction 
? How to visualize what is happening? 
3 Establish What the Real 
Problem Is 
Situational analysis & 
Problem statements 
? What the real problem is? 
? Who might care? 
4 Discover the Values of those 
Affected by the Decision 
Set objectives ? What people care about? 
5 Generate Alternatives Generate alternatives Jointly brainstorm broad range of potential 
solutions 
6 Understand and Reduce 
Scatter and Divergence 
7 Quantitative Analyses 
Compare alternatives Iteratively improve and narrow the list of 
alternatives with qualitative and 
quantitative info 
8 Planning to Keep 
Konvergence 
Often forgotten; sometimes 
called Potential Problem 
Analysis (14) 
Plan how the decision will be “kept” over 
the relevant long time periods. 
9 Summary Summary Capture what has been learned; 
continuously improve. 
Perhaps more importantly, we have not demonstrated that decisions made with the assistance of the framework will 
be more sustainable than would otherwise be the case.  We are confident that they would not be worse; the nation is 
spending billions of dollars un-doing past waste management decisions.  In addition to the arguments above, our 
basis for believing that the framework will increase sustainability is also based on having addressed weaknesses in 
past decisions.  In particular, past decisions were made with fewer viewpoints considered; indeed, many were made 
in a period of high national security and secrecy during and shortly after WWII.  Clearly, the opportunity for more 
viewpoints to be brought to bear on the decisions has increased over time; we believe that contributes to the fact that 
many are being re-examined.  (Changes in knowledge certainly also contribute.)  Our framework encourages a wide 
range of viewpoints to be considered earlier and explicit planning for how things may change over time.  This leads 
to the strategic concept of explicitly considering adaptability as one attribute to evaluate among alternatives. 
The following sections describe the process steps and illustrate how they can be applied to intractable decisions. 
Step 1. INTRODUCTION - WHAT MAKES THESE TYPES OF DECISIONS SO DIFFICULT? 
There is a mix of several answers to this question: time, trust, filtering of information, uncertainties, etc. 
Time - Some hazards, e.g. toxic metals, will exist indefinitely; there is no known practical way to destroy them.  The 
same is true for long-lived radioactive isotopes and for some very stable toxic organic compounds.  However, some 
hazards, e.g. short-lived radioactive isotopes, will decay naturally even if left alone.  Others, e.g. toxic organic 
compounds, can sometimes be destroyed using existing technologies.  The long time horizon means that the 
problems are multi-generational.  And, the further out in time one looks, the greater the uncertainties. 
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Societal experience in making such cleanup decisions is not long; indeed decisions made a few decades ago are 
being re-done.  Furthermore, there are different time horizons embedded in different regulations, which were 
produced for different hazards in response to laws passed at different times in response to different real and 
perceived needs.  Sometimes the regulatory time horizons are short compared to the duration of hazards. 
Thus, the framework has a central theme of time.  Time influences the mental model, motivates some of the 
strategic re-framing and consideration of adaptable alternatives, influences the scope and boundaries included in 
“situational analysis,” and determines qualitative and quantitative analyses to perform. 
Participation and Trust - Making cleanup decisions is difficult at best.  Why? 
“The lack of trust in DOE and its site operators is a major impediment to reaching consensus not only on the 
type and degree of remediation needed, but also on the process to reach these decisions.  …  The representatives 
of the general public, workers, and the Native Americans – all of whom expressed notably low confidence in 
the technology and in the current understanding of the risks associated with the sites – were frustrated by their 
inability to participate substantively in the making of key decisions related to environmental and health 
monitoring, agenda-setting for risk assessment, and the choice of remedial alternatives.  For them, the process 
by which a decision is made was as important as the decision itself, both because the process shapes the 
decision and because an open, inclusive process can provide stakeholders with a much fuller understanding of 
the alternatives than a closed hierarchical one.  Furthermore, these stakeholders were fundamentally distrustful 
of DOE’s and its contractors’ ability to understand stakeholders’ values and concerns and to incorporate them 
into decision-making.” (11) [Emphasis added.] 
These difficulties are not limited to DOE nor cleanup.  Indeed, political science observers note the ineffective 
adversarial, procedural, regulatory manner in which many decisions are approached today.(15,16)  Kemmis writes, 
“collaboration has arisen and spread because it offers an alternative to the highly adversarial form of public 
involvement that now dominates almost all public decision processes. … Collaboration slices through this Gordian 
knot in a totally unexpected way.”(16) 
The framework includes ideas to increase participation and improve trust.  Examples include: importance given to 
values in the Konvergence mental model, a chapter devoted to discovering values, careful monitoring of the values
component while assessing alternatives, and recognition that values will change over the time horizon of interest. 
Lack of holistic approaches - In the energy field, Rose describes a problem he calls “selective inattention”,(17) 
which we believe applies equally well to cleanup: 
“Faced with such a wealth and breadth of information, views, goals, and paradoxes, the reader, company, 
government agency, or other group molds some particular subset of the whole into a locally logical framework, 
then acts as if that construction were the whole of it.  What is inside - nuclear power or conservation or national 
security - is the key to all, and what lies outside becomes either selectively ignored or recast to support the 
central theme.  To be sure, daily life demands selective inattention, or else we would overwhelm ourselves with 
remembered trivia, but in dealing with naturally extensive topics like energy, it is to be guarded against.”(17) 
Consider a few statements found in the literature or in conversations… 
? Not in my backyard! - yet the hazards will continue to exist somewhere until they decay or are destroyed to a 
level that stakeholders consider ignorable
? I don’t care what it costs, get rid of it. - yet society does have limited resources and we need to wisely spend 
them. 
? All “they” have to do is follow regulations (said by opponents of proposed actions)
? All “we” have to do is follow regulations (said by proponents of proposed actions)
Everyone points to regulations when regulations agree with their position, but point to difficulties in regulations 
otherwise.  Yet, regulations are not always protective, nor are they always appropriate.  The regulatory time 
horizon can be less than the duration of key elements of a decision.  There is a legal bias against taking action. 
? Cleanup is too complex; separate the stages of the problem - yet the problem is unavoidably interconnected. 
All are mental shortcuts that aim to simplify the “problem.”  People cannot process everything.  Our mental model - 
knowledge, values, and resources - is intended to encourage a minimum level of processing of information, 
spanning those three universes and therefore encouraging at least some balancing of perspectives.  More broadly, 
Table II shows factors that can stall a decision or block implementation, and how our framework attempts to help. 
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Table II. Factors Increasing or Decreasing Resistance to Making a Decision 
Increase resistance to make a 
decision
Increase pressure to make 
a decision 
Our framework … 
Low time pressure High time pressure Time pressure is an external constraint 
outside the framework.  Decisions made 
because of time pressure may not stand the 
test of time. 
Accountable to constituents rather 
than opposing negotiator 
Accountable to opposing 
negotiator rather than their 
constituents 
Encourages group setting and collaboration. 
“Prospective outcomes are framed 
as losses rather than gains.” (18) 
Frame outcomes as gains 
(versus status quo) 
Encourages decision networks that maximize 
risk reduction (a key gain) faster than loss of 
adaptability (a key loss) 
“When parties have a good rather 
than bad alternative to an 
agreement.” (18) 
Good “Best Alternative to 
Negotiated Agreement”(19,20) 
Poor alternatives to agreement Emphasizes the consequences of “no action” 
Polarized decision environment 
(9) 
Collaborative consensus Promotes collaborative environment 
Bargaining over positions (20) Exploring ways to meet both 
sides’ interests, Principle-
driven negotiations 
Encourages establishing values/principles to 
guide both the process and the result  
Considering the problem in only 
one way (21) 
Approaching problems with 
pluralist mix of methodologies 
and methods. 
Provides a broad balance perspective on the 
three universes; a broad range of specific 
methods can be applied as needed. 
Failing to consider both process 
and content of decisions (21) 
Consider both process and 
content. 
Process and content are considered 
throughout; the search for values explicitly 
addresses both. 
Late entry players bring new 
viewpoints to decision (10) 
Inclusive decision process to 
obtain diverse views earlier 
Identifies and invites stakeholder 
participation, includes a generic set of values
as a minimum to consider, includes scoping 
analyses and earlier testing generic categories 
of alternatives with participants 
Lawsuits (15,16) Collaboration Stresses that regulations are an imperfect 
“snapshot” on values; stresses the need to 
understand the values universe 
Lack of compelling reasons to act, 
situation too complex (22,23) 
Situation understandable; 
compelling reasons to act 
Includes subject matter info to clarify the 
situation 
Precautionary principle caution 
against taking action leading to 
irreversible harm 
Precautionary principle 
caution against not taking 
action to protect against 
irreversible harm 
Include both viewpoints, offer strategic re-
framing to put adaptable alternatives on the 
table. 
Uncertainty (24) Certainty Includes adaptable alternatives as a way to 
proceed if certainty of “permanent” solutions 
inadequate 
High risk/high cost Low risk/low cost Includes (preliminary) extensions to tools to 
provide earlier indication of risk and cost 
Incomplete or misleading 
boundaries of the problem (25) 
Inclusive problem boundaries Includes examination of problem boundaries 
and appropriate decision level. 
Research in different areas shows that when people perceive solutions as gains rather than losses, they are more 
likely to want to proceed.  Even the process used to rank and compare alternatives shifts.  In well-defined behavior 
testing, often the gains and losses are clear - monetary incentives.  The cleanup arena is more complex.  What are 
the key gains and losses? 
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Losses: Losses are more than hazard or risk to people.  The threat to workers during cleanup activities is a potential 
loss, as is irretrievable use of financial resources.  Another is the irretrievable use of political capital.  The risk to the 
public has both short-term (hazards released during cleanup actions) and hypothetical longer-term (hazards slowly 
escaping over long time periods) components.  Buried waste is not an immediate loss, but a longer-term threat.  
People want certainty (make the problem go away, it might hurt me or my children later).  Therefore, perhaps a 
“loss” if the hazard is not eliminated now is the loss of certainty of future protection.  Another “loss” seems to be the 
flexibility to do something different later if a “permanent” “wrong” alternative is implemented now.  This relates to 
the concept of regret.
Gains: The hazard exists.  One alternative is often framed as a gain versus another because it is cheaper, less risky, 
faster, etc.  This can be both true and an attempt to frame the overall solution as gains versus losses.  The real gain is 
reduction of risk relative to the status quo, which is the existence of a hazard with its associated risk. 
People have difficulty with uncertainty.  People do not approach problems solely from a risk-cost-benefit 
standpoint; therefore standard “utility theory” is incomplete.  For example, Hogarth (24) studied decision making on 
whether to buy a warranty on VCRs, CD players, etc.   Participants had incomplete information on the probability of 
equipment breakdown, cost of repair without the warranty, etc. 
“Cost-benefit models did not explain subjects’ choices well under conditions of risk.”  “It is perhaps ironic that, 
under ignorance, when people should probably think harder when making decisions, they do not.  In fact, they 
may be swayed by the availability of simple arguments that serve to resolve the conflicts of choice."(24) 
The literature, e.g. (22,23), suggests that people look for compelling reasons to justify their decisions, especially 
when they feel accountable to others.  In fact, selections among alternatives change if the accountability (be 
prepared to justify your decision) is stressed before or after they receive information (in both cases before they make 
a decision).  They process the input differently if they know they will have to justify the output selection later.  
Similarly, when people are satisfied that one or more existing alternatives are adequate (as opposed to continuing to 
look for new alternatives) depends in part on how much they feel they must justify their decisions to others. 
STEP 2. THE KONVERGENCE MODEL FOR SUSTAINABLE DECISIONS 
Our approach is based on the need to establish and maintain konvergence among the three universes of knowledge,
values of those affected by a decision, and available resources.  We call this the KONVERGENCE Model for 
Sustainable Decisions.  Investigation and availability of data defines knowledge of both the problem and (later) of 
possible solutions.  Participation of stakeholders specifies values.  The availability of budgets, offsite waste disposal 
sites, etc. drives resources.  Acceptable alternatives are those in the konvergence of knowledge, values, and 
resources.  Konvergence must be maintained as the universes change if the decision is to remain acceptable.  Some 
past decisions to bury waste appear to have drifted out of konvergence; such cases have become cleanup challenges. 
We believe that many decisions appear to be attempting to only achieve konvergence among regulations,
knowledge, and project resources.  The problem is that following prescriptive regulations is neither always 
sufficient nor always necessary.  It is possible to point to examples where a selected alternative was completely 
consistent with regulations, but ultimately blocked by public pressure.  And regulations themselves often include 
provisions that allow exemption to, exclusion from, or modification of prescriptions in the regulation provided that 
those impacted agree.  Decisions must be built on something deeper than regulations—the values of those 
potentially impacted by the decision or implementation of one or more possible alternatives.  Thus, we model 
regulations as an imperfect overlay or “snapshot” of values and suggest that a better way to view the challenge is to 
achieve konvergence of values, knowledge, and resources.
This is consistent with the thinking of political science observers such as Kemmis, who writes (15) that the 
American representative democracy has become too dependent on regulations, procedures, and lawsuits with too 
little attention to communities and the people that live in them.  This often leads to stalemate and controversy, and to 
complex and often conservative regulations.  By restating the decision challenge from 
convergence of regulations, knowledge, and resources     to 
konvergence of values, knowledge, and resources
we hope to encourage a different understanding of how to address and discuss cleanup decisions. 
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This mental readjustment must go further than simply changing regulations to values.  The three universes of values,
knowledge, and resources each change over the time-period of interest—the time that hazardous materials remain 
hazardous or until society ignores the remaining level of risk from the hazard.  This is true even if the selected 
alternative is to remove hazards and transport them elsewhere.  Until the hazards are destroyed or decay naturally, 
the problem is in someone’s backyard. 
Long-term problems require dynamic analysis because knowledge, values, and resources - or the solution - may 
change.  Sustained changes in values leads to changes in available resources.  Sustained allocation of resources to 
research can increase knowledge.  Increased knowledge can change values or the relative weights among values.
Sustained changes in values also lead to changes in regulations.  It is less obvious that changes in regulations can 
induce changes in values.  Said another way, we believe that values are more fundamental, it drives regulations 
rather than the inverse. 
Previous fig. 1 illustrates how we view the challenge.  Among the set of possible alternatives: 
? Find those that intersect with knowledge, values, and resources.
? Include adequate investigation of the problem and possible alternatives so that the knowledge brought to the 
decision problem is as complete as possible. 
? Stimulate participation sufficiently so that diverse objectives, viewpoints, and concerns are included in the 
values component of the process. 
? Consider the availability of all of the key resources needed to implement the decision. 
? Consider how the three universes may change and what mixture of two strategies for keeping konvergence is 
appropriate—alternatives that are adaptable as knowledge, values, and resources change - or - managing the 
three universes to increase the chance that the selected alternative remains in konvergence. 
To further illustrate the challenge of time—and part of the difference between regulations and values—consider that 
the U.S. has existed for less time than such hazards will last.  People sometimes intuitively doubt whether 
regulations and associated implementing authorities offer adequate protection for centuries.  Our first 42 presidents 
had average terms of about 5 years.  Thus, a waste disposal site intended to operate for 1,000 years spans about 200 
U.S. presidential administrations.  Further, there are inconsistencies in time-horizon among regulations, which 
inhibits having a clear dialogue and societal approach to long-term hazards, especially for contaminated sites 
involving multiple types of hazards.  The regulations were developed in response to laws passed at different times 
by different people in response to different perceived needs.  To illustrate this, note the inconsistency of the 
following regulatory time-horizons: 
? 10,000 years—Nuclear Regulatory Commission and EPA regulations for high-level and transuranic waste 
(10CFR60, 10CFR63, 40CFR191, 40CFR197); 
? 1,000 years—EPA regulations for near-surface uranium and thorium mill tailings (40CFR192) and DOE policy 
for new land burial (DOE Order M 435.1); 
? 500 years—NRC regulations for near-surface burial of low-level radioactive waste (10CFR61); 
? 30 years—baseline EPA RCRA time-period for near-surface burial of chemical hazards (40CFR264); 
? Indefinite—baseline EPA CERCLA time-period for residual hazards (CERCLA requires a 5-year review). 
Meeting a 30-year regulation by “do it once and forget” is not adequate for longer-lived hazards.  People recognize 
that there are limits to knowledge and large uncertainties in assuring resources for such long periods of time.  Thus, 
regulations do not always adequately substitute for identification of the values of those impacted by decisions. 
? There may be inadequate trust in those working the details, the regulators, or those implementing the decisions - 
now or in the future. 
? There is a long time horizon.  There maybe a significant time lag between changes in values and then 
regulations.  The longevity of regulations/regulators may be in doubt.  Uncertainties generally increase the 
further out in time one looks.  There may be doubts about how much we really know about solutions far into the 
future, or how to provide resources for long time periods. 
Thus, previous fig. 2 illustrates that we consider regulations to be an overlay on values. Values are more 
fundamental than regulations.  An alternative can be in konvergence with values but not regulations or with 
regulations but not values. Values are the deeper, more fundamental basis for decisions. 
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STEP 3.  ESTABLISH WHAT THE REAL PROBLEM IS 
All decision processes include studying the situation and identifying the problem.  Here, we emphasize some aspects 
of this step that need special attention. 
A classic difficulty is restricting the range of alternatives by embedding a solution in the problem statement.  
Compare—“what is the best way to remove this hazard?” to “what is the best way to manage the risk from this 
hazard?”  The former statement pre-selects removal as the only class of alternatives to consider.  Instead, attempt to 
write the problem statement as broadly as possible.  The problem statement starts creating a “box”; at this point you 
do not want to draw that box any tighter than needed. 
A related problem is making assumptions that artificially (and erroneously) truncate the boundaries of the 
problem.(25)  For example, assuming that offsite places to take waste will exist; rather than considering that 
decisions to take waste elsewhere will impact decisions to remove waste here.  Thus, carefully analyze how 
decisions may be related - in time, in space, in function (A must happen before B), etc.  If there is a relationship, 
account for it by either: 
? Assumptions - Representing the other decision(s) via assumptions, to be re-examined over time.  In these cases, 
the decisions are logically related but analyzed separately. 
? Combined decision process ? network of decisions - Decision processes to be worked through together with 
stakeholders (including regulators).  This does not mean actual decommissioning actions would have to be done 
together, they may indeed be separated by decades.  But, a single “decision” effort would work through the 
combined sets of decisions. 
In our experience and testing, we find that people are often unaware of fundamental aspects of hazards associated 
with cleanup.  We have found Table III helpful in clarifying the nature of the beast. 
Table III. Generic Types of Hazards Found in Facilities to be Decommissioned 
Type Typically found 
in nature? 
Importance of 
chemical form to 
toxicity 
Does hazard decay 
naturally? 
Do we know how to destroy 
hazard? 
Radio-
active
isotopes 
Yes, with the 
exception of 
some transuranic 
isotopes (a) 
Can affect the level 
of exposure to the 
hazard by altering 
the ingestion or 
inhalation uptake of 
isotopes 
Natural decay is 
fixed for each 
isotope, ranging 
from under a 
second to billions 
of years depending 
on isotope 
Nil prospects for in-situ 
destruction or treatment.  
Ex-situ treatment may be 
practical to separate long-lived 
isotopes from short-lived 
isotopes. 
Toxic
organic 
compounds 
(b) 
No Affects ingestion 
and inhalation 
uptake 
Determines toxicity 
level 
Decay generally 
slow (years, 
decades) and often 
dependent on 
specific chemical 
environment, e.g., 
trichloroethylene 
In-situ decay may be 
deliberately enhanced by 
microbes  
Ex-situ destruction generally 
possible, but with associated 
risks and costs during 
transportation and destruction. 
Toxic
metals
Yes, although 
sometimes not in 
the more 
hazardous 
chemical forms 
Can affect ingestion 
or inhalation uptake 
Generally affects 
toxicity 
Metals won’t decay 
but the chemical 
form may naturally 
change into less 
toxic forms 
Destruction (changing one 
element into something else) is 
not practical. 
In-situ alteration of chemical 
form can sometimes be 
enhanced by micro-organisms 
Ex-situ destruction generally 
possible, but with associated 
risks and costs during 
transportation and destruction. 
The specific radioactive isotopes associated with cleanup are often not the specific isotopes found in nature. 
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Another difficulty is that some contaminated sites and nearby facilities are regulated separately.  If the decisions 
proceed separately, there is the potential that more money is spent reducing a lower risk, missing the opportunity to 
reduce risk more cost-effectively nearby. 
Identify everyone who may care about the decision, their best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA) (19, 
20), their interest, and their history associated with related decisions.  If people have a better alternative than to 
negotiate, then it is unlikely that the decision process can proceed.  It is best to discover this earlier rather than later.  
For cleanup decisions, we stress the “no action” alternative because blockage of decisions tends to result in “no 
action.”  The more people agree that “no action” is unacceptable, the more force there is to proceed with a decision, 
or network of adaptable decisions.  In general, invite as many diverse people to participate as is possible. 
STEP 4. DISCOVER THE VALUES OF THOSE AFFECTED BY THE DECISION 
Participation may be inadequate to get an adequate picture of values.  What key stakeholders or stakeholder 
viewpoints (from Step 3) are not represented among participants?  How different could the missing viewpoints be?  
How well can you anticipate their values, etc.?  What is the risk of continuing without their participation? 
Armed with participants and an understanding of those who (for whatever reason) are not participating, generate a 
list of values and principles for your problem.  Address both process and desired outcomes.  We encourage 
grouping and ordering them so that everyone can see all the values on the table – we suggest doing that in the form 
of a structured hierarchy of values, principles, etc.  We discourage attempting to weight or discriminate in any way 
among values at this stage.  Everyone’s values should be brought to bear on the problem - this does not mean 
granting everyone a veto.  Rather than jump to detailed objectives (e.g., cleanup a site to some specific risk limit), 
start with broad values to maximize the chance for establishing a common ground and increasing collaboration, then 
work downward to principles, strategic objectives, etc.  This is intended to maximize the chance for establishing a 
common ground and either reduce polarization or find a way to proceed in the face of polarization.  Review 
Table IV, which is a generic list of values and principles culled from past studies and our analyses.  They provide a 
minimum set to consider, even if key diverse viewpoints are not yet participating for whatever reason.  They may 
not be sufficient, but they are necessary to be considered.  What should be added, removed, or changed in that list? 
Table IV. Generic Set of Values and Principles 
Equality – the decisions are fair and just for current and future generations 
? Trustee Principle – “Every generation has obligations as trustee to protect the interests of future 
generations.”(7) 
? Sustainability Principle – “No generation should deprive future generations of the opportunity for a quality of 
life comparable to its own.”(7) 
? Chain of Obligation Principle – “Each generations’ primary obligation is to provide for the needs of the living 
and succeeding generations.”(7) 
? Precautionary Principle 1– “Actions that pose a realistic threat of irreversible harm or catastrophic 
consequences should not be pursued unless there is some compelling countervailing need to benefit either 
current or future generations.”(7)
? Precautionary Principle 2 – “Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, scientific uncertainty 
shall not be used to postpone cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.”(8)
Democracy – the decision-making process is open with participation by all 
? Involvement Principle – The process should incorporate meaningful community and stakeholder involvement 
in all phases of decision-making now and in the future. 
? Information Principle – Complete, accurate and useable information should be provided to both current and 
future peoples.
? Invisible Man Principle – The decision, the decision process, and supporting information must be transparent 
and understandable by interested parties now and in the future. 
? Poisoning of the Well Principle – Don’t poison the “well” for future decisions.  The process should make 
future decisions involving related problems and stakeholders easier  by improving the decision environment.
? Tip of the Iceberg Principle (or Canary in the Coal Mine Principle) – Without granting veto power to 
individual participants, concerns must be noted, addressed to the extent possible, and the risk of proceeding in 
the face of strong concerns considered before proceeding. 
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Truth – the decision should reflect the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth  
? Uncertainty Principle – There will be large uncertainties in the knowledge about the hazards, the facility and 
its environs especially their future behavior and performance.  These uncertainties need to be acknowledged, 
documented and communicated with all involved.   
? Faber College Principle – Knowledge is good.  To be able to make a sound decision, knowledge about the 
contaminated situation is essential.  Research will be pursued if complete understanding is not possible. 
? Forest and the Trees Principle  - Understand the characteristics and context of the land and facilities near the 
site or facility in question. Actions that might make sense in one location may not make sense in another.
? Price is Right or Fram Oil Filter Principle  – The stakeholders have a need and a right to know not only what 
the cleanup activity will cost but what the life cycle costs will be.
Reason – the decision should be real, practical, and meaningful 
? What if You are Wrong Principle – Decisions must withstand the test of time amid great uncertainty. 
? Paul Masson Principle – No decision should be made before its time.  
? Perry Mason Principle – Decisions must comply with the intent of environmental regulations regardless of 
current language or interpretation, e.g., protective of human health and the environment.  
? Hippocratic Worker Principle – Above all else, do no harm to the current worker especially when considering 
minimal hypothetical future risks. 
? Little Engine that Could Principle – The decision should lead to actions that are achievable, not necessarily 
easy, but doable with existing resources.  
? Snicker Principle – The decision should be able to pass a snicker test by participants before implementation.  
Beneath principles, consider detailed strategic objectives, tactical goals, and performance measures to the extent 
needed at this point. Our experience and past research (26) suggests that focusing initially on values, rather than 
alternatives or the details of risks, is helpful when the decision is complicated and possibly controversial.  It is also 
critical to maximize flexibility in attacking the problem – permitting out-of-the-box thinking.  Regulations should be 
included in this process, recalling that regulations are neither always necessary nor always sufficient.
STEP 5. GENERATE ALTERNATIVES 
This step is central to strategic framing.  One way to increase the sustainability of decisions and react to the reality 
that knowledge, values, and resources change is to consider the adaptability of alternatives.  Instead of framing the 
range of alternatives in a single dimension—what is to be removed versus kept in place—we suggest a two-
dimensional approach - what is kept/removed and how adaptable is the situation.  Then, three general areas of 
adaptability-hazard option space are as follows: 
? Reusable - Relatively low hazard, variable adaptability - Facility can be released for other purposes, by other 
groups – with or without restrictions on use.  If “any” use of the facility/land would lead to acceptable risk, the 
release is “unrestricted”, e.g., greenfield.  If some users would pose unacceptable risks, the release is “restricted”, 
e.g., brownfield sites. 
? Closed - Relatively high hazard, relatively low adaptability - Facility is put into state with little adaptability, with 
little or no intention to revisit later unless severe unexpected things go wrong.  So-called “entombed” facilities 
would be examples.  Another is deep geological disposal after site closure.
? Adaptable - Relatively high hazard, relatively high adaptability - Facility is kept in an adaptable state, thereby 
keeping future options open while keeping the risk from hazards acceptable to stakeholders for an extended 
period.  Four examples are the concept of “assured isolation” (formerly “assured storage”) of low-level 
radioactive waste,(27) the C reactor at Hanford, temporary spent fuel storage at commercial power plants, and 
the suggestion for adaptive staged decisions at Yucca Mountain.(12) 
STEP 6. UNDERSTAND AND REDUCE SCATTER AND DIVERGENCE 
At this point, we have the right people participating (or as close as possible), participants know the set of what is 
important to each other (values), and there is a set of diverse alternatives.  Then, a miracle occurs and everyone 
loves a single alternative - there is low scatter and low divergence. Scatter is the variance among participants for 
each alternative. Divergence is how far alternatives may be from konvergence.
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In lieu of a miracle, facilitators should guide participants through the iterative process of understanding how 
participants evaluate alternatives, gathering more information, improving alternatives, narrowing the list of 
alternatives, etc.  Throughout we stress: 
? Periodically ask all participants to map alternatives into knowledge, values, and resources universes and 
identify weaknesses for each alternative.  We use a survey form which checks the degree of agreement with 
each universe, degree of certainty of evaluation, and rationale. 
? Use techniques (Table V) as needed to probe more deeply to better understand the evaluations and polarization 
that may exist.  Indicators in survey evaluations can suggest different mental models or beliefs that participants 
may be using (Table VI). 
? Get more information, validate assumptions, perform quantitative analyses as appropriate. 
? Refine alternatives, recognizing the limits of solving values problems with increased knowledge, etc.  For 
example, if an alternative konverges with knowledge, but not values because of a lack of trust—perhaps reshape 
the alternative to expand oversight mechanisms. 
? Combine best features of related alternatives. 
? Narrow the list. 
Refine alternatives using the understanding gained in diagnostic analyses to improve alternatives.  Alternatives that 
have inherent advantages but have weaknesses in some universes may warrant further attention to improve them.  
For example, Shrader-Frechette points out that some conflicts between inter- and intragenerational ethics can be 
reduced by refining alternatives to consider both perspectives.(28)
The final questions at this step are – (a) have we fixed alternatives’ weaknesses by reshaping them?  Those moving 
into or toward konvergence are retained; those remaining highly divergent are discarded and (b) is there an adequate 
diversity of alternatives still on the table?  If so, continue to quantitative analyses.  If not, generation of more 
alternatives or additional refinements to existing alternatives are needed. 
We now digress to illustrative examples of how polarization can occur between reusable and closed alternatives, and 
what might be done about it.  Consider fig. 3. 
Values
Resources
Knowledge
KONVERGENCE
Values
Resources
Knowledge
KONVERGENCE
Values
Resources
Knowledge
KONVERGENCE
Fig. 3. Cause and resolution of potential polarization.  a) reusable alternatives with knowledge and resource
concerns, b) closed alternatives with values and knowledge concerns, c) possibly temporary adaptable
alternative while pursuing means to bring either reusable or closed alternatives into konvergence 
Example - How might reusable alternatives be out of konvergence? 
There is no alternative class that works best for all cleanup problems.  Consider the reusable class of alternatives.  If 
we know how to cleanup a site (knowledge) and have the resources to do so (budget and place to send resulting 
waste) this solution is usually implemented because such cleanup is generally consistent with local values.  The pace 
of cleanup is typically controlled by budgets, which result from values-based prioritization of various needs. 
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Table V. Steps that may help Diagnose or Refine Alternatives 
What Why Inputs Outputs 
1. Map alternatives into 
three universes 
? Identify scatter and 
divergence in evaluation 
of alternatives 
? List of alternatives ? Participant surveys 
2. Discuss any perceived 
inconsistency in survey 
evaluations
? Validate survey results 
and reduce chance for 
misunderstanding 
? Survey results (apparent 
inconsistencies among 
scores or score/text) 
? Validated/adjusted 
survey results 
? Better understanding 
of survey results 
3. Explore mental models, 
context, framing, and 
incentives 
? Reduce mis- 
understandings and 
polarization, improve 
trust and decision 
environment 
? Poisoning of the Well 
principle 
? Existing team dynamics 
and decision 
environment 
? Survey results 
? Trained facilitator 
? Clarification of how 
participants are 
approaching the 
decision
? Improved trust and 
decision environment 
4. Discuss any perceived 
inconsistency between 
regulations and values
? Diagnose regulations 
versus values as 
contributing to 
divergence or scatter 
? Perry Mason and several 
equality principles 
? Divergence in survey 
results 
? Survey text 
? Group discussion 
? Identification of 
possible disconnects 
between regulations 
and values
5. Identify key 
assumptions and 
uncertainties, replace with 
facts or decision networks 
as appropriate 
? Information and 
Uncertainty principles 
? Understand key 
relations among 
decisions
? Expose key assumptions 
? Survey text 
? Survey “c” evaluations 
? Scatter in survey results 
? Group discussion 
? Information gathered by 
participants 
? Fewer assumptions 
and less uncertainty 
? List of remaining 
assumptions and 
issues
? Ways to manage
uncertainties & 
assumptions 
? Plan for assumptions, 
R&D results, and 
networked decisions 
6. Further refine and 
combine alternatives  
? Improve chances for 
finding a konvergent 
alternative 
? Fairly compare best 
versions of each 
alternative 
? Obtain best features of 
similar alternatives 
? Survey text 
? Group discussion of 
how each alternative 
might be improved 
(“what if” questions) 
? Improved alternatives 
? Variations to 
alternatives 
? Realistic adaptable 
alternatives 
7 Use screening factors, 
weighting, and utility 
functions as needed. 
? Probe deeper into causes 
and magnitude of scatter 
and divergence 
? Proceed in the absence 
of consensus 
? Survey text (what are 
participants focused 
on?) 
? Group discussion 
? Deeper understanding 
of how participants 
evaluate alternatives 
8. Narrow the list and 
assess readiness to 
proceed to quantitative 
analyses
? Reduce cost of 
quantitative analysis 
? Move to Step 7 
? Group discussion ? Narrowed, improved, 
diverse list of 
alternatives 
? Group decision to 
proceed. 
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Table VI. Possible Models Inhibiting Progress on a Decision 
Universe Model Possible Indicators 
Knowledge My knowledge is certain, yours isn’t. High scatter in knowledge evaluation. 
I cannot trust knowledge from “that” group,  
Need to pool what we know Modest scatter in knowledge evaluation. 
Values I do not respect the values from “that” group. High scatter in values evaluation. 
I don’t trust them. Withhold information; do not admit that “their” 
alternatives might be fixable. 
I might be able to trust them. Cautiously share information, consider that 
“their” alternatives might have some merit. 
If you win, I lose. Polarized decision environment, high scatter in 
values evaluation likely stalemate 
A win-win is possible. They search for win-win alternatives, actively 
engage in trying to refine alternatives to make 
them acceptable to broader range of 
participants, shared values scores result and 
values scatter decreases. 
Resource Allocated resources are “cast in concrete” Excessively pessimistic resources evaluation, 
high scatter in the resource evaluations. 
 Endless pockets – more resources are always 
possible if I apply enough pressure. 
Excessively optimistic resources evaluation, 
high scatter in the resource evaluations. 
 Use of resources is limited, but the limits are not 
always clear.  Need to find the most effective 
way to use resources among alternatives. 
Balanced resources evaluations, modest 
resources evaluation scatter. 
Consider cases where one of the above conditions is not met.  For example, reusable alternatives may be within the 
values universe but not within knowledge (lack of confidence in the technology to remove or destroy the hazards) or 
resources (no offsite waste disposal, inadequate budget).  Consider spent nuclear fuel – there is no current method to 
destroy the hazard and no place to permanently place it.  Other examples are heavily contaminated sites for which 
no technology exists that allows cleanup at acceptable levels of risk and cost (knowledge and/or resource problems).  
Then, fig. 3a shows how critics might view reusable alternatives.  The dark blue circle shows that under these 
circumstances reusable alternatives would be consistent with values but possibly not with knowledge and resources,
it lies at or outside of the knowledge and resource circles.  Advocates may view things differently. 
Example - How might closed alternatives be out of konvergence? 
Next consider closed alternatives.  It is generally known how to fill a facility or waste site with grout, yet long-term 
barrier behavior may not be adequately understood.  Offsite waste disposal is not needed, removing one resource
constraint.  (But it does require a new resource constraint, long-term land use.)  Budget is typically available.  Such 
alternatives are generally consistent with resources and partially consistent with knowledge.
What about values?  If the hazards are recognized as relatively low and short-lived, a closed alternative is often 
acceptable.  However, complying with regulations may be inadequate to convince opponents that permanent closure 
decisions are consistent with their values.  If “permanent” closure is viewed as posing substantial risk to future 
generations, it can run afoul of the Trustee, Sustainability, and Precautionary Principles in Table IV. 
When critics view closed alternatives as having adequate resources, but also having gaps in knowledge of long-term 
behavior and inadequate attention to intergenerational values, they are viewing closed alternatives as shown in 
fig. 3b.  Advocates may view things differently.  Indeed, advocates can be correct in saying that a closed alternative 
is consistent with a short-term regulation (e.g. 30 years).  The underlying problem is that regulations and values are 
not always in harmony; our model considers regulations as an imperfect overlay of values; eventually the 
differences should decrease.  If so, a solution consistent with regulations today may become divergent later. 
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Diagnosis 
In such situations, fig. 3a and 3b show that neither reusable nor closed alternatives are in konvergence.  A polarized 
situation has developed.  Even if such a reusable or closed alternative is selected, the longevity of the decision is 
suspect.  Those favoring the reusable and closed classes of alternatives may not speak the same language.  Those 
supporting closed alternatives may believe the problem is only that opponents are not listening to their knowledge.
Those opposed may understand the technical arguments but remain unconvinced about the certainty of protection 
over the duration of hazards.  This pattern appears for many closed alternatives including buried waste and spent 
fuel disposition.  Those supporting reusable alternatives may believe that others simply do not share their values; yet 
people can share such values but realize that the reusable alternatives run afoul of technical and budget limits. 
In such polarized situations, parties often seek advantage through legal/regulatory procedures.  Neither reusable nor 
closed alternatives can be implemented.  Or, if they are implemented, they are unlikely to be sustained unless the 
knowledge, values, and resources universes change so that the decision comes into konvergence later.  Until a 
reusable or closed alternative comes into konvergence, something must be done with the hazards.  If the hazard is 
not stable or its protective barriers are degrading or already inadequate, the worst action is “no action”.  It runs afoul 
of Precautionary Principle 2 in Table IV. 
Medication 
We suggest combining step-wise adaptable solutions with sincere, diligent efforts to increase the likelihood that 
reusable and/or closed alternatives may enter konvergence in the future.  Plans to increase the range of future options 
are needed to prevent those advocating reusable or closed alternatives viewing step-wise approaches as a sham.  
Said another way, if there is no plan B, then everyone recognizes that all efforts are devoted to forcing plan A to 
work.  This means we need a package: 
? Proceed in a step-wise decision network fashion.  Put the hazards/facility into a configuration where they are 
safe, at least temporarily, maintaining maximum adaptability - illustrated by central dot in fig. 3c.  This can 
conceivably be a “closure” under CERCLA, followed by the CERCLA-mandated 5-year reviews. 
? Research better ways to cleanup (or at least reduce) the hazard, to possibly bring reusable alternatives into 
konvergence - illustrated by the upper arrow in fig. 3c.  For existing intractable waste sites, this includes 
research into decommissioning and cleanup technologies.  For spent nuclear fuel, the volume of long-term 
waste can conceivably be reduced orders of magnitude by separating long-lived isotopes and separately storing 
short-lived isotopes.  The long-term hazard could be conceivably reduced, subject to values issues, by reusing 
useful long-lived isotopes (reprocessing) or burning them in reactors.  Accelerator transmutation of waste 
(ATW) may also be helpful if technical and cost issues can be overcome. 
? Improve understanding of multi-generational risks, to possibly bring closed alternatives into konvergence - 
illustrated by the lower arrow in fig 3c.  Improve monitoring of hazards that have already been put into closed 
or closed-like configurations.  For example, if spent fuel were loaded into Yucca Mtn, study how the system 
performs for hundreds of years before further reducing adaptability.  Where waste is left in existing intractable 
waste sites, conduct the research needed to substantially improve understanding of long-term risk.  The 
adaptable “closure” may indeed be eventually considered permanent. 
All parts are needed.  If, for example, efforts that might bring reusable alternatives into konvergence in the future are 
left out, then people will conclude that the only long-term solution will be a closed one and that delay is only that – 
there is inadequate possibility of a different “end state,” only a slower path in getting there.  We offer these further 
suggestions:(4) 
? Minimize the chance of getting stuck at an intermediate point out of konvergence. 
? For intermediate points with a significant chance of being divergent, consider what might be necessary to move 
to a point in konvergence. 
? Assess how risk, cost, and other key parameters vary with time. 
? Consider adaptability as one of the desirable attributes to optimize, with cost, risk, etc. 
? Explicitly discuss the risk of being divergent at intermediate points, the level of adaptability, and tradeoffs 
among adaptability, risk, cost, etc. with those affected by the decision. 
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These general suggestions are consistent with others’ suggestions regarding Yucca Mtn (12,29,30) and how we 
observe that debate evolving - more emphasis on reversible waste emplacement, funding of ATW, reprocessing 
being re-considered to reduce waste volumes.  We suggest more emphasis on having a network of staged decision 
points with multiple “end states”, rather than a single path toward a pre-defined end state, and on the need to plan to 
sustain konvergence.  Similar adaptable networked approaches can and should be developed for high-hazard, long-
duration, intractable cleanup sites.  We recognize the potential ongoing cost and risk associated with adaptable 
solutions but this has to be weighed against the cost and risks of a “no action” stalemate or premature action. 
Test Case 
Our most recent test suggests some optimism.  We engaged a class of students with a simplified version of an 
upcoming INEEL decision.  The problem is cleanup of radioactive waste tanks and surrounding soil.  The 
simplification eliminated the issue of how to treat what is removed (and where it would go).  At the step where the 
framework probes boundaries and decision levels, they questioned this simplification and explored how it might 
affect the remaining decision.  After considerable discussion, they decided to proceed with the simplification.  All 
information came from public documents; some of the cost and risk metrics have been quantified, some not. 
The potential for polarization was evident early, during elicitation of values.  One participant suggested “minimize 
cost”, prompting immediate strong disagreement from another.  The facilitator deferred disagreement, noting that at 
this point we wanted to capture all values, listing them did not mean consensus.  Participants also struggled with the 
best way to express how decision makers should incorporate evaluate the public’s input (process-related values).
They generated 4 alternatives in addition to the four we presented to them from public documents.  In their first 
evaluations, prior to group discussion, one (of 10 participants at this point) found “no action” konvergent with their 
values; seven found “no action” divergent.  All considered “clean closure” konvergent with their values; nine also 
thought “clean closure” konvergent with knowledge.  However, most recognized resource difficulties.  
“Performance based closure” scored lower on values, but higher on resources.
Discussion led to konvergence.  The concept of “adaptability” did not seem to mean much in the abstract, but it did 
as during discussions of some alternatives.  Without need for weighting among values, they reached a consensus on 
an alternative, which was a modified version of “performance based closure”.  The modifications implemented the 
strategy devised by the participants of achieving as much cleanup as was possible now (available knowledge and 
resources) - remove liquids from the tanks (leaving residual “heels” and solids), remove soil hot spots, cap and 
“close” the site - while leaving open the possibility of more cleanup later if warranted.  The “adaptability” package 
prohibits filling the tanks with grout at this time (viewed as too irreversible), ensures monitoring within the 
cap/tanks, re-evaluates every 10 years, and establishes contingency plans if residual contamination migration or 
excessive cap/tank degradation is observed or new better cleanup technologies were available.
Post-test surveys found participants had learned much and were happy with the process and the selected alternative.  
They reported low pressure to conform. The participants understood and positively evaluated the framework, the 
importance of adaptability and being included in the process. 
An additional test is in progress with two parallel classes, one using our framework, the other is standard NEPA. 
STEP 7. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSES 
Before proceeding to quantitative analyses of any kind, it is important to consider how the resulting numbers will be 
used.  Too often, detailed calculations are performed and then become the focal point of subsequent decision 
making.  Worse, they may be used to justify to stakeholders why one alternative should be preferred over others.  
When this happens, the discussion has shifted from considering the entire range of knowns and unknowns in all 
three universes to a debate on the numbers.  Some things can be quantified; some cannot.  Over-emphasis on the 
quantifiable does not help in achieving and keeping konvergence.
One reason sometimes given for not engaging the public earlier is that we have to know how much it will cost or 
what the risk would be before we even put it on the table.  Those are obvious questions that require some degree of 
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quantification as early as possible.  Thus, another part of the framework is to explore extension of existing 
screening/scoping tools for estimating risk and decommissioning cost.  The idea is that approximate answers to 
quantifiable factors may provide enough information to make a tentative decision, or at least narrow the range of 
possibilities.  References 2 and 4. have more information. 
The difficulty, of course, is in deciding what level of precision is required for decision making.  That is, how much 
information is enough and how exact do the numbers have to be?  As a general rule-of-thumb, we propose the 
following guidelines: 
? If one alternative is clearly superior to the others, is in konvergence, and has low uncertainties, do only the 
analyses that are required to move to the next stage. 
? If, even after refinements, an alternative has little chance of ultimately being in konvergence (a no action 
alternative for example), use screening level estimates only. 
? If a good set of comparable historic information exists (a rare situation), then estimates based on the data may 
be superior to calculations from models. 
? If, however, significant uncertainties exist about the alternative's effectiveness, cost, risk, implementability or 
other aspects, then quantitative analysis should continue until these uncertainties are resolved. 
? If enough uncertainty exists to not allow alternatives to be ranked, then quantitative analysis should continue 
until alternatives can be evaluated relative to each other. 
STEP 8. PLANNING TO KEEP KONVERGENCE
Management of konvergence is required over the lifetime of any remaining hazard.  Understanding how knowledge,
values, and resources are changing with time is required to keep konvergence – the situation should be managed so 
that either changes to decisions can be avoided or done in a controlled manner.  We view this step as part of risk 
management or “stewardship.”  There are two approaches—managing one or more universes or managing the 
alternative (keeping an appropriate degree of adaptability).  In many cases, a combination of both approaches will be 
appropriate.  Adaptability was discussed in step 5.  What can be done to manage the universes? 
Consider the decision to go to the moon and fig 4.  (See ref. 1 for more explanation of this example.)  President 
Kennedy gave key speeches in 1961 and 1962.  The first suggested a goal to go to the moon; the second stated more 
strongly, “We choose to go to the moon…”  In 1961, we model “decide to go to the moon” as having significant 
uncertainties in all three universes, with significant chance of being outside of each universe.  Thus, the first diagram 
in fig. 4 shows the decision (shaded area) as being large (significant uncertainty) and intersecting the edge of each 
universe.  It was not known if we had the technology, political will, nor resources to get there.  By 1962, Kennedy 
had captured the imagination of many people and built enough support in Congress to obtain budgets.  The primary 
uncertainty was technical; thus the decision is shown uncertain relative to the knowledge universe.  In July 1969, the 
uncertainties had shrunk, the decision was in good alignment with all three universes, and Armstrong, Aldrin, and 
Collins made history.  By 1972, the uncertainty in knowledge had actually grown slightly because of the near-
disaster Apollo XIII.  Interest in continuing to go to the moon was waning.  Budgets were being cut and were more 
uncertain looking into the future.  At present, we probably have the knowledge to return to the moon, but neither 
values nor resources are evident. 
Fig. 4.  Apollo moon landing decisions over time 
Changes in values led to changes in resources and knowledge.  As konvergence with values strengthened, more 
resources became available.  Then R&D provided by resources slowly improved knowledge, while the 
corresponding uncertainty decreased.  In 1969, everything aligned.  Since then, sending men to the moon has moved 
out of the values universe and the resources are not available.  Eventually, the necessary knowledge will degrade. 
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Planning ideas for konvergence 
Provide incentives.  While maintaining a decision over time is often necessary or desirable, it is not clear that 
people will want to try to maintain konvergence for the timeframe of decades, centuries, or more.  More research is 
needed to clarify under what conditions people will try to maintain konvergence. 
A “carrot and stick” analogy* may be useful in looking at incentives for maintaining konvergence: 
o Incentives to acquire and use “good stuff” 
o Incentives to avoid risk or perceived risk from “bad stuff.” 
“Carrot” or “good stuff” incentives can encourage maintenance of konvergence (e.g. maintenance of remedial 
barriers or restrictions on land use) or discourage maintenance of konvergence.  Some long-term examples include: 
o Encourage: the structure has obvious advantages if it is maintained (e.g. Roman aqueducts and roads) 
o Discourage: the acquisition or use of “good stuff” defeats the protection (e.g., known riches in Egyptian 
pyramids and tombs overcame fear of curses; commercial benefits from new uses of valuable land overcome 
land use restrictions). 
“Stick” or “bad stuff” incentives encourage maintenance of konvergence to continue to do something about the 
hazard (this may not be what was originally planned, however, and as such would be particularly detrimental to 
attempted end-state decisions).  The strength and longevity of such “stick” incentives are also uncertain—to a great 
extent, the magnitude of the incentives depends on the actual or perceived risk of exposure to the hazard.  Examples 
of varying levels of this risk or perceived risk include: 
o High: Part of the strategy considered for Yucca Mountain and WIPP is to provide long-lived warning of the 
risks of intrusion 
o Medium: Egyptian pyramids and tombs “protected” by curses 
o Low/zero: Roman aqueducts and roads. 
One set of incentives can overwhelm the other.  We agree with preliminary observations by colleagues K. Kostelnik 
and G. Harbour that some people lost interest in keeping land-use restrictions at places like Love Canal, New York.  
One hypothesis for this outcome is that the incentives to use the land in non-protective ways became too great.  This 
would be an example of “carrot” incentives trumping “stick” incentives. 
Stabilize one or more universes. 
? Stabilize knowledge by archiving the knowledge of the problem and the implemented solution both locally and 
nationally.  Find ways to pass information down from generation to generation.  Continue monitoring/inspection 
to increase knowledge of the system and research to improve ways to mitigate/manage the hazard. 
? Stabilize the values universe by reducing the chance that future changes in values can induce people to try to 
undo protection.  Be sure that the alternative was selected on the basis of wide and effective participation of 
people with different values in the first place; this reduces the chance that new people with new viewpoints 
would substantially change the values universe.  Explore adaptable solutions that can accommodate anticipated 
changes in values.  Ensure that intergenerational equity is a prime factor in the decision. 
? Stabilize the resources universe by providing for long-term financial resources such as by trust funds.  In the 
context of cleanup and waste disposition, consider if waste could be looked at as a resource in the future and 
take this into account when making disposal decisions—potential resources in the system could provide 
“carrot” incentives for the movement of the resources universe boundary, which may cause decision points to 
fall out of konvergence.  Invest in other resources development activities (e.g., training, building infrastructure, 
and resource substitution) to ensure continued resource availability. 
Create an Early Warning System to give as early warning as possible of divergence.  We illustrate with a 
medical analogy.  For decades, medical experts have stressed the importance of prevention and early detection.  The 
chance of unfavorable outcomes from diseases increases the later that problems are detected.  We believe that the 
same concepts apply to maintaining and managing konvergence for decisions.  Yet, too often, we are only detecting 
problems after the patient has died. 
                                                          
* Some of the carrot/stick analogy is based on discussions with INEEL colleagues K. Kostelnik and G. Harbour. 
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Typically, at present, there is no organized “early warning system” for values or resources.  So, all of a sudden, we 
can find that a decision is so out of konvergence with values or resources that the entire decision process has to be 
restarted and already-implemented decisions re-done.  At least there is some attempt to monitor part of the 
knowledge universe, specifically the onsite performance of remedial actions such as confinement barriers.  Typical 
current practice, consistent with regulations and technology, is to monitor barrier performance by groundwater 
surveillance wells.  This will catch barrier failures, but only long after they occur.  It would be better to develop 
more capacity to detect early indicators of failure.  This will increase protection of the environment and reduce the 
cost of repair to containment/barrier systems by catching problems earlier.  Even better would be to extend this 
concept to all three of the universes described in the KONVERGENCE Model. 
Comparing the actual trends with the expected trends can alert decision-makers to the potential need for corrective 
action and can trigger formal action if a pre-established action level (also called an intervention level or trigger) is 
reached.  Action levels are levels at which some corrective action must be taken.  As with laws and regulations, 
action levels are manifestations of the values universe since they are an indication of what participants and society 
believe to be important.  Laws and regulations (e.g., CERCLA, RCRA), court orders, contracts, records of decisions, 
etc. can all establish required action levels for various factors. 
STEP 9. SUMMARY 
We believe that making and keeping decisions with long time horizons involves special difficulties and requires new 
approaches.  Therefore, society needs the following: 
? New ways (mental model) to analyze and visualize the problem, 
? An option to shift strategy or reframe from a single decision to an adaptable network of decisions, and 
? Improved tactical processes that account for several challenges. 
Our KONVERGENCE framework addresses these challenges.  The framework is based on a mental model that 
states: where Knowledge, Values, and Resources konverge (the K, V, R in KONVERGENCE), you will find a 
sustainable decision.  We define these areas or universes as follows: 
? Knowledge: what is known about the problem and possible solutions? 
? Values: what is important to those affected by the decision? 
? Resources: what is available to implement possible solutions or improve knowledge?
This mental model helps analyze and visualize what is happening as decisions are made and kept.  The framework 
includes strategic and tactical process improvements derived from experience, values, and relevant literature. 
We believe our framework can make it easier to make decisions that have proven difficult if not impossible to make.  
We diagnose some decisions as having a very high “activation” barrier, i.e., a very high resistance to making the 
decision.  The resistance comes from one or more stakeholders (including regulators) because they either do not 
trust the person making the decision or view the consequences of being wrong as too high among other reasons.  In 
such cases, we must either reduce the consequences of being wrong (e.g., by implementing adaptable alternatives 
that can be fixed later if necessary) and/or split a single decision into a network of decisions (e.g., earning trust at 
each step as in some international diplomatic situations). 
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